What is additionally exciting about this video is it is available to local and state judges through their Sheriff’s office for FREE. The USMS has distributed the first version without charge to Sheriffs throughout the country to enable them to proactively engage their judiciary in security in a manner that is non-threatening, but educational. Project 365’s Version 2 will be distributed soon, enabling Sheriffs to continue to educate their judiciary on safety practices that they can implement.

Inarguably judges are the critical stakeholders within the court security context and we as the court security practitioners are responsible not in just protecting them but educating and including them in security matters. The free Project 365 DVDs offer an excellent opportunity to proactively engage our judiciary in a non-confrontational manner.

In that same vein of safety practices for our judges, the federal government has a statute that originated out of the 2007 Court Security Improvement Act that can act as a guide for state legislatures. The US Code, title 18, chapter 7, section 119 prohibits a person revealing restricted information about a judicial official or their immediate family. In other words a person cannot put a judge’s home address or telephone numbers on the internet with the intent to threaten or intimidate a judge. The maximum penalty for violating this statute is five years of imprisonment.

While this may seem a severe restriction of the freedom of speech to some individuals, I believe it is a prudent security enhancement for our judiciary in general. The Virginia House of Delegates just passed a bill the other day, HB 556, which would prohibit publication on the internet of personal information of certain public officials. Those officials include Virginia judges. The courts have reinforced the idea that freedom of speech is not unlimited, i.e. you cannot yell “fire” in a crowded movie theater, causing unnecessary panic and harm if no fire exists.

Enacting a state code modeled on the federal statue to protect judge’s personal information would not add a monetary burden, but would demonstrate the commitment by our communities that judges are not to be intimidated nor threatened.

For example, in 2005 the Fulton County Courthouse in Georgia experienced a horrific courthouse attack by Brian Nichols, where the judge presiding over his trial and a court reporter were killed inside the courthouse, a Sheriff’s deputy was gunned down trying to stop his escape and a federal agent was killed while Nichols was on the run. In addition to the tragic loss of those four people and all they meant to their loved ones, Fulton County settled two lawsuits in 2008, one with Judge Barnes’ widow and the other with the court reporter’s estate, for approximately $5 million each. Further the Sheriff at the time also lost his primary race within his own party and was out of office after one term. Finally, the confidence of citizens in the ability of court security to keep them safe was shaken, both within Fulton County and across the country.

The Fulton County event is an extreme example of what can go wrong in any courthouse on any given day in our country. To mitigate this type of event from occurring, specific courthouse and judicial threat training must occur. This naturally leads to a discussion on where we can obtain court security training. I would urge court security professionals to look outside of their in-house training to gain a broader perspective and learn from others’ mistakes without having to pay personally the high price of experience.

YouTube is one of the best, and free, real world training sites for any court security practitioner. It is one that I consult regularly. I do this by looking at courthouse/courtroom video recorded incidents on YouTube. Initially I search for courthouse fights, evacuations, and the like and then take a hard look at what occurs within the video. From there, local news articles and interviews about the event clarify the background and basis of the incident. I then reflect on the event and seek lessons that can be learned and used to improve my courthouse security operations.

There is quite a bit we can learn just by watching other court security officers on the job as recorded on YouTube. For example, how court security officers initially positioned themselves in the courtroom. By examining the initial physical position of the court security officer(s), you may ascertain whether they were in the best place to respond or could they have been in a more advantageous place before the incident occurred. In addition, seeing how the court security officers restrain actively resisting parties in the courtroom can provide telling insight into the level and application of defensive tactics training. Even the number of court security officers that were present in the courtroom at the beginning of an incident versus how many it took to physically control a subject can give insight into the staffing needed for a controversial trial.

YouTube videos on courthouse evacuations show how orderly or how chaotic an evacuation proceeded. It also reveals how the public felt about the evacuation – whether they felt the court security officers were knowledgeable or not, in control or not or even whether they were polite. You can always count on a news reporter to ask the public if they felt the court security officers evacuated the building properly.

Perceptions in this job are a big deal and it is important that the public feels safe and confident in those charged with securing the court. While not going too far off on a tangent, news reports highlight the extremes of our profession and it is critical for us to ensure that the public feels secure in their court security practitioners’ preparation. While somewhat uncomfortable to realize, the public often bases their viewpoint of how well we do our jobs on the last major incident that was covered on the news or shown in the latest viral video on YouTube.

You can receive valuable court security training that is cost effective from a variety of entities. If you are willing to act as a host for court security training and/or judicial threat management, you will often receive a discount if enough other law enforcement participants attend. For example, the Virginia Center for Policing Innovation offers that particular price break. Contact Sheila Gunderman (sgunderman@vcpionline.org) at www.vcpionline.org if you are interested hosting a regional court security/judicial threat training and having me come and instruct.

[Note: VCPI is the group that facilitates the court security/judicial threat management training I conduct across the country – as such I do have a bias]

The National Sheriff’s Association, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Steve Swenson’s Center for Judicial and Executive Security, Advanced Law Enforcement Readiness Training, and Public Agency Training Council are other entities that offer court security training.

Beyond law enforcement training, a further area to consider is inviting trusted civilians to test your systems, either through a tabletop exercise or in a controlled environment. Such non-experts will often try things that court security experts know are impossible…and sometime they succeed. Always remember that those seeking to violate court security are also not security experts and therefore think outside of the law enforcement security rulebook. By bringing in people at the same knowledge level of potential threats, we can avoid being blinded to security gaps by our own expertise. These civilians can be recruited through local citizens’ police academies, community support groups or even among courthouse tenants.

The resources for court security training do exist, and it may take some effort to secure them, but I am confident in the worth of the training in both human and monetary measures.

Until the shooting on September 13th, the Crawford County Courthouse only provided security screening at the courtroom entrance when court was in session. Lacking money for deputies to monitor the station, people who were serving community service as part of their criminal sentence ran the metal detectors. The courthouse has six entrances and the authorities did not feel justified in spending the money for security at each entrance or when court was not in session. Crawford County Judge John Hall was quoted as saying, “We just didn’t feel insecure.” As a result of the shooting the courthouse now has only one public entrance, ironically the same entrance that Palmer used to begin his rampage. That entrance has a metal detector and deputy sheriffs to monitor it. A robust screening station with properly trained staff is an essential element in any courthouse security program. This is the area where we establish the location of the gunfight. Cover, concealment and alert staff are needed at every courthouse to effectively ensure the safety of the courthouse tenants and users. Crawford County Judge John Hall stated that with the security changes, “They’ll have to fight their way in, instead of fighting their way out.”

Palmer appeared at the Crawford County courthouse around 3:30 p.m. in a long trench coat. The outside temperatures were above 90 degrees Fahrenheit. Well-trained court security professional would have spotted something amiss had they seen Palmer approach. It is not normal for people to wear long coats on hot sunny days. However, there were no security personnel present to observe and take preventive action.

Palmer committed an act of targeted violence, not a random rampage to kill whoever was nearest. His actions that day emphasize the need for court security professionals to have a protective investigative and threat management program in place. Palmer was intent on killing the judge that proceeded over his divorce and child custody hearings in 2001. The primary reason Palmer was not successful in killing Judge Cottrell was that the judge was at home with a knee injury. Palmer shot four times on his way to the judge’s chamber, striking the judge’s case coordinator in the leg. His gun jammed when he tried to shoot Judge Cottrell’s secretary and she was able to flee Cottrell’s office to safety. He then proceeded to shoot at courthouse staff on his way out of the building. , Once outside, he walked towards his motorcycle and then fired on a responding Van Buren police officer who sustained minor wounds from flying glass and bullet fragments. In twelve minutes of shooting, Palmer shot between 70-90 rounds, at least 16 within the courthouse and the rest on the lawn of the courthouse, both while he was firing randomly and when he was engaged with police. Many more rounds could have been expended and more people hurt or killed, but his .223-caliber assault rifle repeatedly jammed, perhaps due to a weak spring in the ammunition magazine. He also had two handguns on his possession which he used in his gun battle with police.

People do not just snap and commit an act of violence. The literature in this area is quite emphatic on that point. Palmer was giving indications of violence for years, even before his divorce in 2001. Judge Cottrell had signed a protective order for his wife in 1999, based on physical abuse and threats of “hunting two-leggeds”. His mother-in-law has stated that before her daughter and Palmer walked into the courtroom for their divorce in 2001, Palmer said that he had purchased two guns, one for his soon-to-be ex-wife and one for the judge if he did not like the outcome of the proceedings. His ex-wife was awarded custody of their son by Judge Cottrell. In the intervening years, Palmer obsessively talked about the divorce and harassed his ex-wife. In 2003, his ex-wife filed a motion for contempt based on allegations that Palmer assaulted her when his son was not home for Palmer to pick up for visitation. Questions remain however of what caused him to do what he did ten years after his divorce. Palmer probably had one final catalyst for his rampage, some sort of perceived grievance or stressor. Was it the loss of his job in May after a physical fight with a relative of his ex-wife over visitation with his son? He filed for bankruptcy in 2005, did he a reoccurrence of money issues especially after losing his job? Did he experience some other recent personal loss or was it seeing an article in a paper about a motel shooting that was found in his home that gave him the idea to go after Judge Cottrell? Why did he pre-pay for the storage of his personal items and then send the key to his brother-in-law? Why did he set fire to his house with incendiary devices right before leaving for the courthouse? Even in the absence of direct death threats to Judge Cottrell, one could argue that these were indicators that Palmer was on a downward spiral, some more imminent than others. A few weeks before the shooting, his mother had contacted the sheriff’s office to check on her son, but cancelled the check while the deputy was in-route. The day of the shooting, Palmer texted threatening and suicidal messages to his family, including one to his mother saying, “Today’s the day. Today I’m going to die”. After receiving that text message, his mother again contacted police to say that her son was threatening suicide. Unfortunately, that final warning was only minutes before her son started shooting at the courthouse. Protective Intelligence and Judicial Threat Management are the two elements needed to address acts of targeted violence in the courthouse security context. These methods can help identify threats before they are inside your courthouse door with weapons drawn.

The incident in Crawford County can be labeled an active shooter incident. You have a subject actively engaging in shooting at people, attempting to kill them. The local law enforcement authorities responded well. The courthouse video shows a strong response with officers from multiple jurisdictions using good tactical formation to engage Palmer. It appears from the security video that they had received active shooter training. Palmer was shot twice and died at a medical center two hours after the shooting. It cannot be emphasized enough on the need for court security professionals to have strong active shooter training and to train with the local departments. However, it is not just the court security professionals that need the active shooter training, but also the tenants of the courthouse.

Tenants in the Crawford County Courthouse conducted a classic shelter in place in response to the shooting. Panic buttons were located under the desks of tenants that indicated to the responders what office was requesting help. Tenants used those panic buttons, called 911 and yelled at co-workers to warn them. They hid in closets, benches, vaults, under desks and behind cabinets. It is absolutely critical that tenants know the proper protocols to an active shooter incident, which also includes fleeing an active shooter if able. One of the courthouse staff members was dissuaded from fleeing out a window by a colleague who refused to leave the perceived shelter of a desk. Beyond active shooter response, courthouse personnel also need to know how to handle other courthouse emergencies as well. Bomb threats, fires and prisoner escapes are just three areas of courthouse emergency events that tenants need training. Having trained tenants that respond in predictable ways in turn enhances the emergency response of the local law enforcement, creating a force multiplier.

Crawford County is not alone in having to balance resources in a tight economy, but do we really need a shooting at every courthouse, in every county, to emphasize the need for courthouse screening stations, adequate security staffing, training, and proper protocols? Crawford County Judge John Hall said about the need for security, “The first time is his fault. The second time, it’s ours.” I hope that we can learn from each other and all courthouse shootings and not have to experience for the first time, much less the second, the trauma a courthouse shooting can inflict physically and psychologically upon a community.

I continue to see the nauseating mantra in court security of “we have never had a courthouse incident, as such we can get by without security” and “we do not want to inconvenience anyone with security” and “we are a safe community, that would never happen here”. In every community, courthouses are the location of the worst days of some peoples’ lives: divorces, custody battles over their children, loss of freedom, loss of money, etc. Some people, stressed beyond their personal ability to bear, choose to take out their anger on the courthouse or courthouse personnel that they blame for the unfortunate turn in their life. Sadly, It is not until someone is shot, killed, attacked or sued, that court security allocations and practices change. Crawford County Judge John Hall said, “We felt secure. Now that we know we’re vulnerable, we’ll pony up.” The Crawford County courthouse shooting provides an opportunity for everyone in the court security community to re-examine their priorities and protocols and take positive, progressive action to ensure their courthouse and tenants are safe.

Citations

Arnold, Jeff, “Prosecutor Releases Courthouse Shooting Video” Times Record Online Edition, 9/22/2011, retrieved 11/29/2011 http://www.swtimes.com/news/article_afbe1d60-e3df-11e0-97f5-001cc4c002e0.html

Arnold, Jeff, “Shooter’s Ex-Mother-In-Law Saw It Coming”, Times Record Online Edition, 9/17/2011, retrieved 11/229/2011, http://www.swtimes.com/week-in-review/news/article_121fee26-e0e2-11e0-81b4-001cc4c002e0.html

“County Judge Vows Better Protection After Courthouse Shooting”, 4029TV.com, 9/14/2011, retrieved 11/27/2011, http://www.4029tv.com/r/29172397/detail.html

Garrett, Rusty, “Crawford County OKs Deputies”, Times Record Online Edition, 9/22/2011, retrieved 11/29/2011, http://www.swtimes.com/news/article_32575e9c-e392-11e0-a8bb-001cc4c03286.html

Hammersly, Lisa, “499 Pages Detail Attack in Van Buren Study: Gunman’s Divorce Left Him Seething 10 Years”, The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 11/16/2011, pg. 11.

Hammersly, Lisa, “Divorce Records Stress Court Gunman’s Anger”, The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 9/19/2011, pg. 8.

Hammersly, Lisa, “Report Details Terror of Shots at Courthouse. More Security Implemented”, The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 11/20/2011, pg. 17. Hammersly, Lisa and Dave Hughes, “Shot-Up County Building Reopens. Courthouse Sees Security Tightened”, The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 9/16/2011, p. 9.

Hughes, Dave, "Judge Says He's Thankful Bum Knee Kept Him From Shooting", The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 9/15/2011, pg. 4.

Hughes, Dave, "Video Details Shooting Scene at Courthouse. Fatal Shot From Police Unclear", The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 9/21/2011, pg. 9.

Hughes, Dave and Lisa Hammersly, “Today I Die, Gunman Texted Mom. He Shot Up Courthouse, Waited on Lawn for Police, Sheriff Says”, The Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 9/15/2011, p. 1.

Merchant, Nomaan, “Ex-Wife of Arkansas Courthouse gunman won ’99 Protective Order, Claiming Abuse”, Associated Press, 9/15/2011.

Raache, Hicham, “Police: Judge Presided Over Slain Gunman’s Divorce”, Times Record Online Edition, 9/14/11, retrieved 11/27/2011, http://www.swtimes.com/news/article_fd2908dc-dee2-11e0-82c7-001cc4c002e0.html

Raache, Hicham, “Update: Suspect in Crawford Courthouse Shooting ID’d” Times Record Online Edition, 9/12/2011, retrieved 11/27/2011, http://www.swtimes.com/news/article_635031f8-de52-11e0-a5cd-001cc4c002e0.html

Meloy and his colleagues propose definitions for leakage as well as warning behaviors. He first defines leakage as “communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to a target” and warning behaviors as “any behavior that precedes an act of targeted violence, is related to it, and may, in certain cases, predict it.”

An example of leakage might be a blog posting or a tweet on Twitter by a subject making a statement of harm toward a target. A warning behavior is broader and examples could range from weapon acquisition to communicating harm to a target. These two articulated operational definitions provide a framework for the practitioner to use by incorporate their professional experience into an integrated whole.

In addition, Meloy in his article The Concept of Leakage, clarifies that leakage can be listed as a warning behavior. He then goes on to discuss the motivations a subject may have for leakage – be it on purpose or not. He warns the reader that leakage is not a signal indicating a subject wanting to be captured or stopped from their intended act, but may indicate the imminence of an attack on the target.

Meloy and his authors go on to identify eight potential warning behaviors for the practitioner of threat assessment to use in conducting their investigations: pathway, fixation, identification, novel aggression, energy burst, leakage, directly communicated threat, and last resort warning behaviors. Each warning behaviors are defined in more detail in his second paper which also warrants a read by threat assessment practitioners.

In my opinion the most important argument that Meloy and his colleagues make in both papers is the need to move threat assessment from “unstructured to structured professional judgments”. While this may be somewhat controversial to those who have been successfully practicing in this arena by themselves without such format, it is not sustainable. Without standard methods for threat assessment, we lack a curriculum to transfer knowledge to the next generation of investigators in a systematic fashion. Not only would such a structure help us make sure that hard-won knowledge would be transferred to future practitioners, it would also help current threat assessors.

The structured professional judgment methodology offers a valid, defensible way to articulate the assessors’ actions in an objective fashion to a court, protectee or supervisor. What exactly are the inputs into the structured professional judgment methodology is still evolving, but that is the direction we must be moving if we hope to better protect our judges. Court Security is more than just protecting a courtroom or courthouse; it is also essential that the judiciary itself be properly protected from those that wish to cause it harm. In order to provide this high level of protection, we must stay current with the literature in threat assessment even if it means an occasional heavy academic read.

Citation: Meloy, J. R. and O'Toole, M. E. (2011), The Concept of Leakage in Threat Assessment. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 29(4): 513–527. doi: 10.1002/bsl.986

Reid Meloy, J., Hoffmann, J., Guldimann, A. and James, D. (2011), The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment: An Exploration and Suggested Typology. Behavioral Sciences & the Law. doi: 10.1002/bsl.999

Q. As the Director of Court Security & Emergency Preparedness what are your responsibilities in general for the Arkansas Judiciary?

A. I report directly to the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. My primary responsibilities include assisting the Supreme Court Committee on Security and Emergency Preparedness with development and implementation of security and emergency preparedness plans (CSEP) for our state courts. I administer our Court Security Grant program. I am responsible for the development and implementation of the Arkansas Court Security Officer Training program, which is certified by the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training. I serve as the point of contact on security and emergency preparedness issues for the judicial branch. Also, I speak statewide to associations of court-related personnel, i.e. District Court Clerks, Circuit Court Clerks, Trial Court Assistants, and Probation Officers.

Q. How did you become selected as the first Director of Court Security & Emergency Preparedness for the state of Arkansas?

A. The position was created in late 2006, I believe. I heard about it soon after it was created, but it wasn’t until 2007 that the position was announced through local web/print media. I submitted a resume and began the multiple interview process. I believe what tilted the decision makers my way was the previous and very recent law enforcement experience. In my position as director I work with local police and sheriffs on a daily basis.

Q. What were your initial thoughts when you heard that an active shooter attacked the Crawford County Courthouse in your state on September 13th?

A. On that Tuesday I had just arrived home from the office when I received the call, roughly ten minutes after the first 911 call. My first thought, like anyone’s would be was how many were shot, who was shot, any confirmed dead, any officers injured? Then it was where is the shooter, who is the shooter, is there only one shooter? Within two minutes I had explained to my family what was happening and was on the road to the scene. As I pulled out of my driveway I received another call. This one was from an AOC manager informing me that he has five staff members there at the courthouse. These programmers were assisting the Crawford County court clerks with a new hardware system. The courthouse is a three-hour drive from my home, so I worked the phone maintaining contact with those staff members (none of who was injured) and law enforcement at the scene.

Q. While it’s still early, what types of lessons (in the context of court security) do you think the Crawford County courthouse shooting has to offer the practitioner?

A. The issue is that a balance must be struck between safety/security and convenience. In times past we erred on the side of convenience. In today’s climate the scale MUST tip to security. A perfect idiom here is: An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure.

Q. The US Marshals Service has a national Threat Management Center whose purpose is to investigate and analyze threats to the Judiciary. Do you think Arkansas might eventually create a like center for its judiciary?

A. Discussions have taken place in meetings across the State, but there is no plan on paper to create a Threat Management Center. Although, I do think we will be there one day. Not surprisingly, there were no known threats from the gunman in the Crawford County incident.

Q. What has Arkansas been doing to enhance the security of its courts and judiciary since you have been Director?

A. We have seventy-five counties. Sixty-six of those now have court security and emergency preparedness plans developed. Along with assisting the counties in developing the plans we have shared exactly one million dollars in state grant money to help implement those plans.

Q. You require a Court Incident Form to be filed within 3 days of a courthouse event. What has Arkansas learned from them and how does it use them?

A. Honestly, we have much work to do regarding the Court Incident Report Form. We require it to be completed and submitted, but there are no consequences for non-compliance. Some counties are better than others in submitting the report. The AOC programmers are currently developing software for tracking data from the reports. As of now the reports can be accessed electronically and information gleaned from the reports separately.

Q. What are some of the current challenges Arkansas is facing in regards to Court/Judicial Security?

A. Well…and I doubt this is a shocker to those in our industry, but it’s definitely the lack of funding. With our grants we encourage the purchase of and /or installation of security equipment, i.e. walkthroughs, package scanners, CCTV, panic buttons. A sad reality is that we can help with the equipment, but we can’t help with the personnel. So you may have a well-equipped courthouse and no warm body to man the detectors or watch the monitors. Since our grant is not promised year to year, it doesn’t make sense to hire an officer with funds that may disappear.

Q. How do you think a local court security practitioner can best protect their court/judiciary?

A. A short answer is this: 1. Minimize the number of entrances. 2. Install walk-throughs at those entrances. 3. Man those entrances. 4. Provide constant, uniformed officer coverage in the courtroom during all types of court sessions/hearings/ trials. Of course that is a short answer to a long problem and we know there is so much more to protecting the courts. Training is a must as is communication with stakeholders. We all need to educate ourselves and use the resources available to use. Your website/blog, National Center for State Courts, National Association for Court Management, and United States Marshall Service are great sources for information, materials, handouts, and templates.

Q. What do you hope to leave as your legacy?

A. I will be content with my work when members of the judiciary, court staff, litigants, jurors, and visitors can go about their business in a courthouse with relative peace of mind. As the first person to fill this role in Arkansas’ government, I fill privileged in being able to work with our Legislators, Judges, Sheriffs, and Chiefs of Police while using my background and experience to work towards improving court security.

Judge Acioli had a reputation in Brazil for being particularly tough on organized crime and especially former cops who participated in criminal activities. Just a few days prior to her murder, she had handed out tough sentences to some former policemen that were allegedly involved in criminal activities. Judge Acioli had been the recipient of death threats for the past five years but continued to perform her duties with zeal and without police protection.

In a judicial career that involved sentencing more than 60 dirty cops to prison, she was unique in her fearlessness of organized crime. In her last interview to a local Brazilian newspaper, she was asked if she was concerned about being killed for doing her job. She responded,

“We are all afraid to die, but to have a fear of death is one thing, and not doing my job because of this fear is totally different. I do not think I will die because of my work. It is a philosophical question that I prefer to abstain from, but I think when we act seeking something effectively concrete, you have protection. So I do not think I’ll die as a result of my work”-- http://rioradar.com/archives/578

Sadly, Judge Acioli was wrong as she was targeted and killed by those that found her effectiveness and toughness as a judge too great a threat to them. She was just 44 years old.

The Brazilian Supreme Court responded quickly and publicly, condemning the killing of Judge Acioli. They demanded a swift investigation and severe punishment. Supreme Court President Cezar Peluso stated that an attack on a judge was an attack on the Brazilian state and democracy. Currently in Brazil there are at least 87 judges under active death threats of which 13 receive round-the-clock law enforcement protection.

Judge Acioli’s death was a tragedy to not just her community and Brazil, but to any country that embraces democracy and an independent judiciary. While I do not know if Brazil has adopted a national judicial threat management program that is pro-active in mitigating threats to their judiciary, it is critical that a systematic process be established to address such threats everywhere.

While the US Marshals Service has a National Threat Management Center for the US Federal Judiciary, there is still no national clearing-house to address or mitigate state and local judicial threats in a systematic manner. It is critical that we create a national, systematic process that identifies, analyze, manages and mitigates threats directed toward our state and local judiciary or we risk having qualified judges leaving the bench for a less risky profession.

“Hard-Line Brazilian Judge Patricia Acioli Murdered Brutally Outside of Her Home in Rio de Janeiro,” Voice for Human Rights, http://voiceforhumanrights.org/2011/08/23/hard-line-brazilian-judge-patricia-acioli-murdered-brutally-outside-her-home-in-rio-de-janeiro/

Lopez, Ari, Gustavo Carvalho and Kiok Charet, “Nao accredito que vou morrer por cause do meu trabalho” O Sao Goncalo, published August 12, 2011, English translation of Judge Acioli’s last interview-- http://rioradar.com/archives/578

Masr, Bikya, “After Brazilian judge is slain, rights expert calls for more protection”, http://bikyamasr.com/40156/after-brazilian-judge-is-slain-rights-expert-calls-for-more-protection-2/

Last month, I had the opportunity to visit Wiesbaden, Germany and tour the Smiths Detection factory where they make their x-ray machines. The purpose of my site visit was to see how they assembled their machines and to get a sense of their vision for the future of x-ray technology and screening processes.

Not knowing anything about industrial factories, I must say the Wiesbaden factory was quite impressive: very clean, organized and efficient in appearance. It was quite apparent that they are used to hosting visitors on factory tours, as they were patient and gracious with their time and expertise.

On the tour, I quickly learned that the heart of any x-ray machine is the x-ray generator. As the most critical piece, manufacturers extensively test their x-ray generators to ensure quality and reliability. In addition, I learned that x-ray generators are encased completely in high-grade oil that circulates internally to dissipate the intense heat created by the generator.

What caught my eye, and would of any court security practitioner, were the x-ray machines with dual monitors. The purpose of dual monitors is to provide the practitioner with two separate views of the same object, one in a vertical and the other in a horizontal plane.

As I watched a demonstration of the dual view x-ray machine, I saw the significant advantage of having the capability. It enabled me to easily identify objects on the monitor without the need of having to re-send or reposition the object. To create this dual view, Smiths machines use four x-ray generators. This is important to note because it makes the dual machines much larger and heavier than the normal single view machines. With most courthouse security entrances designed around single view machines, the extra weight could be a consideration in whether to convert to dual-view machines.

Another unexpected learning point was the new challenges that Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) monitors present to x-ray machines. The visual refresh rates on the LCD are not the same as the CRT monitors. The LCD monitor refresh rates cause images in motion to slightly blur as they move across the screen. Once an image is stopped on the LCD, it is crystal clear. However, the blurring of the object in motion is not helpful to those of us that need to process large numbers of persons at a courthouse screening entrance. It can distract a staffer trying to view an object and contribute to fatigue. Smiths has partnered with a LCD manufacturer to address this issue.

My time at the Smiths factory in Wiesbaden was quite enjoyable and I learned a great deal of what goes into the actual making of an x-ray machine. While it may not be practical for every court security practitioner to visit an x-ray factory before buying a machine it is quite beneficial to look under the hood once in a while and see first hand what makes them tick.

(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2004196/Facebook-Juror-Joanne-Fraill-jailed-8-months-contempt-court.html) The sentencing of the juror and the impact of social networks on the court system in England is causing quite a discussion across the pond.

Having jurors get in trouble for social network abuse is somewhat new to our European counterparts, but we have already had problems in the United States. Reuters Legal (RL) news service conducted an experiment last year involving Twitter. RL found over a three week period when searching for “jury duty”, tweets occurring at the rate of one nearly every three minutes! Most appeared to be just general complaints about jury duty but others addressed the defendant’s innocence or guilt – before deliberations! At least ninety challenges have been filed based on juror’s internet misconduct, including one juror who had posted a cell phone picture of a murder weapon. (http://lawforward.legalzoom.com/consumer/jurors-and-social-media-a-problematic-mix/) Jurors have been punished, including a juror in New York who texted a friend while he was deliberating, causing a mistrial. He was fined $1,000 on June 15th. (http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/queens/judge_to_texter_ur_so_bu_ted_TMV5Ebv43zF2TEoJlT0MlM)

The implications for the court security practitioner are quite stark in this context. The practitioner must be aware of what is occurring out in cyberspace and to do that they must engage social networks. Our authority as a court security practitioner may not reach into juror misconduct, but it does in identifying potential security threats to the court –wherever that may be. It is in the social network dynamic where the new threats are emerging to our protectees, the courthouse facility and the integrity of the jury system.

One relatively new group that is attempting to address this issue of balancing media and the courts is the Reynolds National Center for Courts & Media. The center just published its second journal and it focuses on the dynamics of social networks and the court system – it’s a good read! One of the articles discusses a case that was put in jeopardy by jurors communicating with each other via Facebook. (http://courtsandmedia.org/journal/)

While it may appear that I have deviated from court security, I have not. Bans on cell phones and computers in the courthouse are a natural outgrowth of attempting to reduce inappropriate communication no matter whether through tweets, blogs or cell phone pictures. Once a prohibition is in place, it is our duty to enforce it, adding a layer of complexity to court security. Inappropriate social networking by any person involved in a case is a threat to the integrity of the court system. It is our responsibilities as court security practitioners to Protect the Court from threats and this is definitely one that is here to stay….

Once this is accomplished, then one could ideally build the necessary political will with demonstrated objectives/consequences and distribute scant resource monies in an efficient, transparent, and objective fashion.

Ms. Fisher correctly points out our current state of risk-based methodologies is more focused upon qualitative assessments (low, medium, high risk) than that of a quantitative type (numerical scale: 1 being low-risk to 5 being high-risk). I especially believe this is true in the Judicial Threat Management arena.

It is this shift from a qualitative to quantitative methodology that Ms. Fisher explores, and that I believe would be more beneficial to our justice system. It would provide a more systematic standard upon which competition for resources could be more correctly allocated. How one goes about quantifying threats and risks in the judicial setting is the real challenge, and one that Ms. Fisher attempts to address.

In her thesis she breaks down risk into a mathematical formula adopted primarily from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and other security practitioners: Risk [R] = Threat [T] x Vulnerability [V] x Consequence [C]. Each of these elements are then defined in her thesis using definitions from the Office of Domestic Preparedness: “threats are indications or events with the potential to cause loss of, or damage to, an asset”; “vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited to gain access to an asset”; and “consequences is the impact to the owner in case of loss or damage to an asset.”

It is important to note that there are severe critics of the formula R=TxVxC. One argument is that the formula elements are not well defined or mutually exclusive of one another. Mathematicians will delve into the possibility that the formula violates the axioms of probability theory and inductive logic. These are important matters to be made aware, but they should not negate the seeker in looking for a quantifiable way to address risk objectivity for our Judicial Branch.

Ms. Fisher points out in her thesis is that the courts have been aware of risk based methodologies for at least the past 25 years, but no substantial adaptation or development in this area has occurred, at any local, state or federal level. This is truly a ripe area for a student of court security to capitalize upon, be it an academic or practitioner. I have posted Ms. Fishers thesis on my website for downloading. Her paper should be read by any serious court security practitioner.

Catherine Scott-Gonzalez received a split lip, broken nose, fractured jaw and contusions to her eyes. The person who stopped the attack was her attorney Michael Dunleavy, as there were no court security officers or bailiffs in the judges’ chambers. Court security officers responded to the incident when Judge Rothschild activated his panic button and they took Mr. Gonzalez into custody. Mr. Gonzalez is now being held in Broward County jail on a one million dollar bond for felony battery and resisting arrest. Judge Rothschild in his comments to CNN about the incident stated “if he had had any indication that Gonzalez was violent, he would have had security in his chambers.”

A few days later, at the Bergen County Courthouse in New Jersey, William Sadler allegedly attacked a male friend of his wife in a family courtroom. However, this courtroom had a courtroom security officer that was able to restrain Mr. Sadler until backup arrived. This gained some news traction as Mr. Sadler was reported as being 6 foot 6 and 425 pounds, a large man by any definition. While the victim was choked, court security officers were able to stop Mr. Sadler before any serious injury could occur to the victim. Bergen County Sheriff Lt. David Moody was injured in the incident and Mr. Sadler was charged with aggravated assault. Sheriff Michael Saudino of Bergen County, New Jersey stated in the news “Unfortunately, one never knows what might happen in a courtroom…”

The contrast between these two incidents is quite plain. While both involved issues of family dispute, the security context was striking. One occurred in a judicial chamber without security present and resulted in a significant injury to not only a litigant, but also to the idea of the court being a safe place. The other occurred in a courtroom with a security officer in the room and resulted in both lesser injury to the victims and stronger confidence of courthouse security.

The contemporary court security practitioner knows that judicial chambers are not the place for disputing divorce parties, regardless of any indications of violence issues between the disputants. Typically, judicial chambers are small, inviting and do not have the necessary physical and psychological security barriers of a formal courtroom. Further, without the presence of a court security officer or bailiff, one is trusting that litigants will follow proper court decorum, when there have been numerous incidents around the country that show that emotions can and will override courthouse etiquette.

The case (Souhair Khatib v. County Orange – case number 08-56423) originated when Souhair Khatib, a practicing Muslim, was remanded into the custody of the Sheriff and was placed in the Santa Ana Courthouse’s holding facility for a few hours. During that period, she was ordered to remove her hijab, headscarf, by a male officer. She explained to the officer that it was against her religious beliefs for a male other than her husband or male relative to see her head uncovered. She was told that if she did not remove it, the officer would remove it for her. Khatib reluctantly removed her hijab, as being touched by the male officer would also be a violation of her beliefs. She then remained uncovered in the holding cells, visible to male officers and inmates.

Upon her release, Khatib filed a lawsuit stating her rights under the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) as passed by Congress were violated. RLUIPA specifically states in section 3:

[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in [42 U.S.C. § 1997], even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

In its ruling, the 9th Circuit focused specifically upon the definition of institution under 42 U.S.C. § 1997. It found that a courthouse lockup/holding cell is an institution as defined in RLUIPA and remanded the case back to the lower court. The lower court will need to address whether the burden imposed on Khatib is the least restrictive given the confined setting and context.

While the courts sort this out, the court security practitioner must be aware of this new dynamic and plan accordingly. One way to reduce this current exposure would be to use a person of the same gender to conduct the search of a remanded female – and keep the female out of sight of other male individuals during the search process.

However it should also be noted that the US Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) stated:

“[s]hould inmate requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution; the facility would be free to resist the imposition.”

Events such as emergency exigencies could require a male officer to remove someone’s religious clothing for their and others safety – but we must be aware of this new 9th Circuit ruling. It is important to note that the 9th Circuit court vote was unanimous, 11-0, which is indicative of the court’s strong view on the matter.

FPS specifically cited 41 C.F.R. 102-74.420 for Mr. Musumeci’s arrest. The New York Civil Liberties Union then sued the federal government on behalf of Mr. Musumeci and the government settled the case on October 13, 2010. The settlement required the government to return Mr. Musumeci’s media card and pay him $4,850, as well as provide assurances that federal officers would be instructed that it is not illegal to take photographs or video recordings outside a federal courthouse.

While it may be disconcerting to court security officers that are charged with protecting a courthouse, the federal case above makes it crystal clear that it is not illegal to photograph or film the exterior of a courthouse from a public area. In fact there are websites that have numerous photo galleries of courthouses from around the country. For example, a basic search for the Supreme Court on Flickr, a picture sharing website, brought up over 5000 photographs of the Supreme Court, many of them obviously vacation pictures. One website that has an extensive U.S. courthouse photo collection is from the United States Department of Agriculture (of all places).

It is important that court security officers be made aware that while the security of the court is always our primary concern, there are individuals – armed with the above legal information – that want to test court security officers to ensure that we know the law. Further be mindful if you find yourself in a confrontation over photography or filming, that the subject may have a friend recording your interactions from a distance. This should not inhibit your duty to investigate but make you aware that there may be an ulterior motive for a subject to be confrontational during such an event.

I find those that film or photograph courthouses for this reason primarily seem to be seeking attention from those of us in law enforcement more than anything else. They then usually share such events on sites like YouTube where they can then publically show their gotcha moment of court security officers, sort of as a competitive sport.

Despite knowing that these individuals are out there, court security must engage suspicious activity around the perimeter of their courthouse of a person photographing or filming the exterior of a courthouse especially of entrances, exits, parking areas, etc. While some subjects are merely there to provoke a supposedly entertaining confrontation, others are true threats. Determining which activity is occurring is a legitimate court security activity – and it definitely lets the subjects you are investigating know that you are actively watching them and that you are doing your job to ensure a safe courthouse and ultimately a safer community.

Their study provides a fundamental foundation for anyone whose duty is to protect a public official – say like a judge. The study dispelled many myths on assassins and found that no real profile existed, but there were constant themes. One particular theme – that of avenging a perceived grievance is one that I have found to be particularly strong when it comes to those threats that are directed to the judiciary.

Add the perceived grievance with someone that has experienced a traumatic event – say the loss of a marriage or of a job and we have a recipe for an attacker in the making. A final element can be the absence of an adequate social support structures such as faith, friends or family. When a person with a perceived grievance and without a support system experiences significant stressors, they can begin to see violence as the only alternative.

It then becomes the protector’s – or judicial threat manager’s - challenge to help refocus the potential attacker and provide them with alternatives to violence. The Exceptional Case Study is a critical read for those of us charged with protecting the judiciary as it provides a fundamental foundation in understanding of what motivates those to attack public officials and possibly how we can disrupt that direction of violence. However, it is important to note that the literature in this field is evolving.

David V. James, M.A., co-author of the Stalking Risk Profile and member of the Fixated Research Group - www.fixatedthreat.com, published an article this past June, Protecting the prominent? A Research Journey with Paul Mullen, Criminal Behavior and Mental Health, Vol. 20, Issue 3, p. 242-250, July 2010 that extends the research done in the Exceptional Case Study.

In particular the authors focused on mental illness and threats that can arise from mental illness as significant factors in analyzing the possibility of assassination Mr. James, from his analysis, believes that threat managers need to note that most of the subjects, who make inappropriate communications or threats, have some mental disorder. Further a majority of subjects “had a history of verbal or written communication about the target.”

Threats and inappropriate communications directed at the judiciary have become a part of the judicial dynamic. Sadly these types of communications will continue. It is ever more critical for those of us assigned in the field of court security to seek valid ways to mitigate those threats, by consulting both classic and new finding in the field. It is the only way that we can ensure we are doing all that we can.

The basic question is whether a courthouse should be designed as a place of warm refuge for victims and witnesses or an imposing formal presence designed to confine, intimidate and/or contain dangerous societal elements? A simplistic answer might be yes to both. However, this is not a light question and this type of thought and research is critical for court security practitioners as we work every day in finding the correct balance in the constantly competing philosophies of convenience, access, transparency and security.

There are several well-written white papers on this website; one particularly caught my eye entitled: Security in Courts: Issues & Options by Professors Rick Sarre & Tim Prenzler (http://www.justiceenvironments.edu.au/attachments/sarre-and-prenzler-paper-uws-conference-2010.pdf). The paper focuses upon the issues of governmental responsibility in protecting visitors to the courthouse and court administrators privatizing the security of the courthouse. Sarre & Prenzler began the paper by listing several recent courthouse incidents that have occurred in Australia & New Zealand that demonstrate a trend of increasing violence in their courts.

They then go on to inform the reader of when and where courthouse security privatization occurred in parts of Australia – implied of which are the cost savings to the administrators. All of New Zealand’s courts are protected by public court security officers. I would interject that the privatization of courthouse security does not waive nor ameliorate the government’s liability and responsibility in supervising such court security duties. They also raise the question of whether private sector security personnel have the powers and immunities that government security professionals are granted. With the privatization of courthouse security in parts of Australia, Sarre & Prenzler stress, rightly, the importance of ensuring continuous, quality professional training.

As practitioners in the field of court security, it is incumbent upon our profession that we consistently question current methodologies and seek new processes and practices that have the potential to enhance the safety of our courthouses. It is through combining academic study and practitioner experience that we can then create and test potentially constructive methodologies that add true value in creating an open yet secure courthouse where grievances can be shared and adjudicated by the rule of law. This type of active engagement is the only way that I am aware of in which we can hope to stay ahead of the curve.

The IG report, which is approximately 81 pages, is not a difficult read and provides a specific list of 15 recommendations for the US Marshals – most of which if not all - could be adopted as a best practice for those of us charged with protecting courts. As with any organization or individual, there is always room for improvement.

In this post I want to focus on a few of the recommendations that I believe could be readably adopted by other offices and agencies charged with protecting a court facility.

Recommendations are quoted from the report – bullets directly below are my comments:

Recommendation 1: “Ensure that all USMS district offices regularly review and update their Continuity of Operations Plans and ensure that annual security surveys are performed at each district and that all judicial security plans are updated as required.”

• Ensuring Continuity of Operations Plans and annual security surveys as well as security plans are performed and updated as needed are essential for all of us in the court security business. COOP plans and like security plans/surveys help to formalize our planned responses during a critical event in which time is not a luxury. A step further is to issue COOP cards like the one pictured to all non-law enforcement personnel within the courthouse setting. It provides the most essential of information that someone would need to know. It is something that the courthouse tenants’ can keep with them, rather than try to remember what to do after they are locked out of the building containing their full COOP plan. As an added benefit, it can serve as a confirmation that a new courthouse employee has had at least a rudimentary orientation to the COOP procedures.

Recommendation 2: “Ensure that all of its district offices assign a principal coordinator to the district Court Security Committee and encourage the local judiciary to lead regular meetings.”

• A Court Security Committee provides a real tangible pro-active measure that all courthouses can adopt. By their nature court security committees create an opportunity to discuss concerns specific to a court facility in a forum that provides a larger perspective than the usual security context.

Recommendation 3: “Ensure that all Judicial Security Inspectors and CSOs are appropriately trained before entering on duty. The USMS should also develop a process to ensure that all Judicial Security Inspectors and CSOs are adequately trained on newly deployed screening systems.”

• Training is always a critical component, particularly in the court security dynamic and is a continuous challenge especially when competing with other requirements for budgets and time. However, even the most basic of refresher trainings, such as defensive tactics classes, provide huge dividends to the individual officer and that of the organizations, in terms of control, confidence and a reduced risk of liability.

Recommendation 4: “Ensure that its district offices perform the required quarterly unannounced tests to determine if CSOs are adequately screening visitors, packages, and mail that are delivered to the courthouse and maintain records of the results.”

• Conducting unannounced security tests upon court security staff should not to be thought of as gotcha events. Nor should they be seen or presented as a lack of trust between the administration and line court security staff, but as a means to build confidence and ensure that they are receiving proper support and equipment. These types of audits, if correctly performed, build confidence of the court security staff and help to keep officer complacency at bay.

While some agencies react negatively to audits of their organization, the US Marshals has had the fortune to have a strong visible leader in Director John Clark. This is explicitly clear in his positive public responses to the report and in his concurrence with the IG recommendations. I strongly recommend that you read the report, if you have not done so already, as it provides valuable information and takeaways for everyone involved in the protection of the courts.

The website for the report is located at:

http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/USMS/index.htm

You can also view it on my website protecting court at:

http://www.protectingcourt.com/court-security/usms

 A further consideration is how often they will practice their new skill sets as well as whether it will it be combat style or target shooting. Beyond these weapon choices and training considerations is how the judges plan to carry the weapon upon their person, proficiency in weapon retention techniques, and where they will store the weapon at work and home, are all questions that at a minimum need to be addressed.

While I am not a firearms expert, firearms training if done properly is much more than just learning how to shoot a gun. What you see in a courtroom is not all that a lawyer does – there is a lot a preparation and thought that goes into what a lawyer presents in a courtroom. That same level of diligence must be taken when judges decide to arm themselves.  In addressing one element about general firearm security – such as where to secure a weapon for a member of the judiciary at the courthouse, one has to be mindful of an incident that occurred in a Texas courtroom in 1991.

During a court recess in the Texas capital murder trial of James Bigby in early 1991, Mr. Bigby grabbed Judge Don Leonard’s gun from a drawer in his bench. Mr. Bigby then ran into Judge Leonard’s chamber, pointed the gun at his head and stated, “Let’s go.” Fortunately Judge Leonard was able to subdue Mr. Bigby with the help of a bailiff and prosecutor (http://www.star-telegram.com/2008/10/08/960670/archive-2006-james-bigby-returns.html) and the trial was able to resume shortly afterward – finding Mr. Bigby guilty of capital murder.  The trial was able to resume after Mr. Bigby’s counsel motioned for a mistrial and for Judge Leonard’s recusal, both were denied. In two appeals to the US 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bigby v. Cockrell, 340 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2003) and Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2005), Mr. Bigby appealed the conviction partially based on Judge Leonard’s refusal to recuse himself after the assault and the provision of information about the assault and escape attempt to the jurors.  

Upon learning of the 1991 incident, one immediate thought I had was how did the defendant know the judge kept a gun in his bench? I do not know the answer. I do think that this type of information needs to be guarded and should not be known to a defendant. However, this is essential information for court security to know.  If a judge is armed in the courtroom, the bailiffs must be able to factor in the existence of a weapon not under their direct control into their court security planning.  Also, any incident is usually a cascade of events, including the fact that the defendant was allowed to approach the bench in the first place. Bailiff Tim Stallings testified that Mr. Bigby got up like he was going for a drink of water and then ran towards the bench and grabbed the gun.  (Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, Mr. Bigby knew where the judge’s chambers were due to the fact that he had been taken through Judge Leonard’s office when the elevator that he usually took back to his jail cell was broken. All of these individual events contributed to Judge Leonard being threatened with his own gun.

Questions of whether the judiciary should arm themselves are not new.  One Justice that received numerous, valid death threats responded to a colleague with this quote in regards to whether he should arm himself.

“No, sir! I will not carry arms, for when it is known that the judges of our courts are compelled to arm themselves against assaults in consequence of their judicial action it will be time to dissolve the courts, consider government a failure, and let society lapse into barbarism.”

US Supreme Court Justice Stephen Johnson Field

(1816-1899)

Justice Field had a strong opinion about carrying arms, as he was not shy in sharing it. However his opinion is not the only one on this topic nor is it the final one. However, it is important to note that during his lifetime he experienced both the civil war and ‘wild west’, where it was common that individuals openly carried weapons. I would not be surprised to find that this issue of whether a judge should arm themselves in the U.S. does not find its way into all discussions on judicial or courtroom security at one time or another. Judge Leonard testified about the incident in his court and said that he had the gun in his bench so he could survive if everything went sour. 

Most states in the U.S. offer some sort of basic court security training for judges, whether that is at an initial judicial orientation (rookie school) or later at mandatory in-service training – and this is a good thing. While not taking sides, if a judge wishes to be armed, then they need to receive proper training from a certified firearms instructor – hopefully a local law enforcement entity can provide training and proper guidance.  This is not a light topic – whether a judge should be armed or not. I believe it is a private decision, for each judge, but not one to be made lightly but with professional guidance, diligence and proper forethought, as it has a profound impact upon not just judicial and courthouse security but the community as well.

Fortunately I was introduced to the author, Lorena Parada-Valdés, through a mutally respected colleague. We then exchanged some emails and phone calls and she gracioulsly consented to an interview for my blog as well as allow me to post her ‘white paper’ (Security for Court Interpreters).

As way of background, Ms. Lorena Parada-Valdés holds a Master’s Degree in Justice Management from the University of Nevada, Reno, and has conducted research on court security over the past four years. Her recently completed master’s thesis focused on the use of protective details to safeguard the judiciary, and her manual, Security for Court Interpreters, published in 2006, included advisors from the Federal Judiciary, the United States Marshals Service and the National Center for State Courts. 

Lorena’s experience includes living and working in combat zones in Central America and the Middle East. A frequent presenter on the topic of court security, she is a member of the Association of Security Educators and Trainers (ASET) and is an avid student of the martial arts. In addition to her passion for security research, Lorena is a federally and nationally certified court interpreter. Her working languages are Spanish, French and Portuguese.

Q: What motivated you to write Security for Court Interpreters?

The inspiration for Security for Court Interpreters came about during a casual conversation I had with two U.S. Marshals in Corpus Christi, Texas, during one of my court interpreter assignments at the federal courthouse. As they explained the rudiments of the 21-foot rule to me – a basic concept in security and law enforcement, but totally new to me at the time – it dawned on me that there are many of us who work as interpreters in courts across the country, in close proximity to defendants, who could greatly benefit from security awareness and training. I had been looking for a presentation topic for an upcoming national judiciary interpreter conference and, as I began to research the topic, it became clear to me that there were few resources devoted to judicial security, and none geared toward court interpreters or non-security-related court personnel. The idea took momentum from there, and what started as an hour-long presentation blossomed into a 300-page manual and training tool.

Q: What was your biggest challenge when you began writing Security for Court Interpreters?

As a layperson approaching the topic, the amount of information to learn, absorb and incorporate into the manual was, honestly, quite overwhelming. I wasn’t sure where to even begin at the outset of this project. Fortunately, I received a tremendous amount of support from the court community, as well as from those involved in security and law enforcement. Many professionals from around the country lent me their expertise, time and efforts, and the manual would have never been published if it were not for their willingness to contribute to this project.

Q: When you began your research, what was the one thing you discovered about security that you did not know at the beginning?

There were so many concepts that were new to me that it becomes difficult to select a single one. I would have to say that the notion of information security made the greatest impact on me because I think it can be so easily overlooked when one thinks of protection in general. When people think about security, the first thing that comes to mind is protecting the tangible – buildings, physical property, and people. Yet protecting the intangible – electronic communications, operational information, and personal data – is just as essential, and a single piece of information in the wrong hands can have disastrous results.

In addition, I came away from this project with a tremendous amount of admiration and respect for all the law enforcement agents, court security officers, bailiffs, deputies and marshals involved in keeping our courts safe, as well as for the judges, attorneys and court staff who brave dangers and threats in order to ensure the administration of justice. As I studied court security incidents, I saw example after example of their dedication to their jobs and to the protection of our system of justice. I will never forget their courage.

Q: Do you think the security perspectives of a court security officer and that of an interpreter or civilian are different? If so, how?

Oh, absolutely. Court security officers are experts in their field. They come to the table with a highly trained eye and a lifetime of knowledge and training. Not only can they respond to incidents with lightning speed, they can also size up a potential security risk in seconds, often averting a crisis before it even begins. This is obviously not the case for interpreters, civilians, and other members of the court family, yet everyone shares the common denominator of concern for the safety and security of the courts. Ensuring basic training in security principles for every member of the court family can go a long way toward keeping our courts safer, since non-security court professionals are often the first point of contact for litigants, defendants, witnesses, jurors, and the public at large. Training them to report a potential anomaly to their court security staff can easily lead to preventing a court security incident from occurring.

Q: I noticed that you have provided Security for Court Interpreters free on the Net. Why did you do this?

I realize that many court entities and interpreter groups often work under budgetary constraints, and I have always felt that access to security training should not be hampered by financial limitations. I am a strong believer in giving back to the community, and providing this manual free of charge on the Web is a small way of contributing to the welfare of the court community, to which I am deeply indebted.

Q: What one thing do you hope that people who read Security for Court Interpreters take away from your white paper?

More than anything else, I hope every reader realizes that security is everyone’s responsibility, not just that of court security officers, bailiffs, deputies or marshals. Every member of the court family can contribute to the safety of our courts and it is through training and awareness that we can achieve this common goal.

Q: What type of feedback have you had on it from your peers and from those that are sworn security professionals, such as Marshals and Deputies?

The response I have received from the interpreter community and from security professionals across the United States has been extremely positive. It is extremely gratifying to speak to interpreter colleagues nationwide who have taken the time to read the manual and who now practice safe habits at their workplaces, at home and when they travel.  Many security professionals have contacted me to talk about using the manual as a training tool in their courthouses and to express their support for this kind of endeavor. I feel fortunate to have the opportunity to exchange ideas with judicial security professionals of such a high caliber.

Q: How has your career changed since the publication of Security for Court Interpreters?

I still work as a court interpreter, but I have developed a tremendous passion for judicial security and have spent a great deal of time researching the topic further. Since the publication of the manual, I have delivered presentations on court security to interpreter groups and court staff across the country. In addition, I conducted research on judicial protection and wrote a thesis on the topic for my Master’s Degree in Justice Management at the University of Nevada, Reno. In the future, I would like to develop another training tool for all members of the court family. I never expected my life to take this turn, but I’m certainly glad it did. It has been an incredibly satisfying journey.

The US 7^th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled last month on August 26^th, that a defendant did not have ineffective counsel merely because his counsel failed to object to the use of an electronic stun-belt during his capital murder trial (Stephenson v. Wilson, No. 09-2924).

The stun-belt in question was placed upon Stephenson in such a fashion that it was under his clothes, but produced a small bulge (according to a juror).  However the trial judge did not indicate on the record whether the stun-belt was visible or not.  One juror in the capital murder trial provided an affidavit that the defendant looked like he was wearing a stun-belt.  A total of four jurors from the jury stated in affidavits that they were aware of the stun-belt, but did not specify how they knew. In the oral arguments of Stephenson v. Wilson it was stated that no juror actually saw the stun-belt itself.

Case law in the US has stated that the nature of a defendant’s charges are not enough alone to interject additional security measures in a jury trial – particularly restraints and restraints that could be visible (Holbrook, Estelle, Illinois, Deck, etc…). Other factors must be included and put on the court record, such as behavior of the individual through the court process and or while in a custodial setting, etc. 

In Stephenson v. Wilson, the 7^th Circuit specifically stated that, “None of the security personnel explained why any physical restraints…would have been necessary once the defendant was seated at the defense table.” Stephenson also argued that the use of the stun-belt without showing him to be a security risk supported the fact that his counsel was ineffective since he made no objections to its use.

The US 7^th Circuit later shared in its opinion that the use of the stun-belt in this trial was not influential upon this particular jury, since it was addressing multiple murders in the context of the state seeking death of the defendant.  In finding that counsel was not ineffective the 7^th Circuit shared that this trial cost in the neighborhood of $500,000, the largest amount spent on a capital case in Indiana at the time.  They further held that a robust “no holds-barred defense” occurred. As such the 7^th Circuit stated that Stephenson did not have ineffective counsel on this particular issue.  However, the court also indicated that if there was other evidence of defense oversights, having a defendant restrained absent a clear cause without an objection from the defense would be a factor in favor of deciding that the defendant received ineffective counsel.

So what does this mean for the security practitioner? First, it is critical that the court record reflect the reason for restraints to be placed upon a defendant in a jury trial. The security practitioner can assist this standard by articulating the reason for restraints beyond the underlying trial charges. For example, did the defendant threaten violent behavior, demonstrate outbursts in previous court hearings or was assaultive towards others while awaiting trial (i.e. corrections officers/deputy sheriffs/police or even their own defense counsel).

In addition, it is clear the courts prefer the least visible and least restrictive restraint be placed upon an individual in the course of a jury trial. When those parameters must be exceeded, facts need to be provided for justification. I proffer that the court security practitioner should be prepared to offer those reasons.

According to media reports, Lt. Liusila Brown was at the courthouse providing security.  He was leaving the courthouse and was approached by Siaumau Siaumau Jr. The suspect then produced a handgun and shot Lt. Brown. Lt. Brown fell to the ground, raised a hand and was again shot by the suspect, killing him. Other police officers raced to their colleague’s aid and wrestled the gun from the suspect, but not without another police officer having been shot. According to witnesses, the suspect continued to scream at Lt. Brown’s body after being restrained stating this is what you get for messing with the Siaumau family.

The first question many of us in law enforcement may have is why did the other police officers not return fire? In American Samoa, it is prohibited for police officers to be armed. Without a service weapon, the American Samoa police officers’ only option was to physically take the weapon away from the assailant.  As a direct result of this tragedy, the American Samoa government is re-examining its policy on not allowing police officers to be armed.

The next question is why did this suspect attack a police officer in the middle of the day, in front of police officers, numerous witnesses and the local media? The choice of time and location by the suspect indicated that he was not too concerned with being apprehended, in fact it demonstrates the singularly focus he had upon his victim – Lt. Brown. Media reports indicate that the suspect’s motive was the arrest of his mother by Lt. Brown on drug related matters. If this is true then it presents a worn out mantra of injured family pride– where a son avenges others for supposedly wronging his mother.

While I do not know first hand, nor do the media reports indicate, but I would not be surprised to discover that the courthouse in American Samoa does not have metal detectors or x-ray machines at its entrance. Since police officers are unarmed, I suspect that those that provide courthouse security are also not armed. This is quite troubling.  As this most recent event demonstrates, violence can occur in any place or culture.

What does this event have to do with court security other than occurring just outside a courthouse? I assert that it is important for a community to ensure that its courthouse and it immediate vicinity be free from fear, intimidation and violence. Further security protocols must be in place to ensure that all are safe from these types of senseless acts of violence. While we cannot prevent a committed individual from bringing a weapon to a courthouse for the purpose of violence, we can put in place security practices, protocols, and equipment that will lower the likelihood such an event. I purposefully state lower as we cannot eliminate such events from occurring, but we must ensure that those who are charged with creating a safe environment have the proper preparation, training and tools to address such incident for when they occur.

 “Siaumau Jr. was officially charged Monday, July 26 in District Court with several felony charges including first degree murder, a crime punishable by life in prison or a term of years not less than 10 and not to exceed 30 years.

Altogether, the defendant is facing 14 felony charges and a misdemeanor public peace disturbance charge. Among the charges are two counts of attempted murder and weapons and ammunitions charges... Among the charges for which the court found probable cause were: one count of first degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, three counts of assault in the first degree and several counts of unlawful possession of firearms.

Ward noted that the court did not find probable cause for the concealed weapons charges as they were not addressed by the government during the preliminary examination hearing. The concealed weapons charges have been dropped by the court, but Ward added that the government can re-file the counts against Siaumau.”

http://www.samoanews.com/viewstory.php?storyid=17560

Court papers have been filed seeking the death penalty.

Rest in Peace Lt. Liusila Brown and thank you for your service.

C-TAV illuminates 185 courthouse incidents of bombings, arson attacks, courthouse and judicial shootings that occurred in the United States from 1970 to 2009. In addition, Steve Swensen provides the reader with five in-depth case studies and their resolutions. Peppered throughout the paper are graphs, charts and analysis dissecting the 185 incidents, such as the 1970 killing of Judge Haley in California and the killing of US District Judge Daronco in New York by a retired police officer.  If that was not enough, C-TAV also references several additional studies that are excellent sources of information for the courthouse security practitioner such as, Courthouse Shootings 1907-2007 by Dr. Gregg W. Etter and Warren G. Swymelar –, Homicide Studies February 2010 vol. 14 no. 1 pages 90-100 and Typology of Stalking: Reliability and Validity Based upon a Large Sample of North American Stalkers by Dr. Mohandie, Meloy, McGowan in January 2006 RECON. It is also important to note that the paper provides a well-accepted standard of practice in describing the characteristics of Inappropriate Communications, in the judicial threat dynamic.

What is unique about C-TAV however is Swensen’s CJES 15 Principles of Criticality. He states that the 15 principles help ensure a program of quality assurance – which is true and are quite cost-effective. His first principle: “A Multi-Discipline Approach Process (MDAP) is required for a comprehensive Court Security Program” dovetails wonderfully with his concentric process of court security diagram. The diagram begins with an outer circle labeled “Policies & Procedures” and then moves into smaller concept circles of “Security Audits/Surveys”, “Security Screening”, “Emergency Response Plans”, etc…until the very center with “Judicial Protectee”.  Other principles of the 15 such as No. 4 “Security Screening and Mail Screening are vital components of a Courthouse Security Program” and No. 15 “Continuing education, professional associations/networking, and specialized training requirements specific to Court Security should be established, promoted, and required on an on-going-basis” are really the pillars upon which a national standard could be fashioned for the emerging professionalization field of court security.

C-TAV provides court security practitioners with an opportunity to learn from the past and provide better security for their courthouses by finding new ways to mitigate future courthouse attacks.

His document can be purchased on his website only - @ http://www.cjesconsultants.com/executive-security-publications.html

Discloser – I did receive a free advance copy of C-TAV and made some very minor suggestions to the author before its official release.

While my Office has but six members, there are more than 2,000 judges, hundreds of clerks of court, court unit executives, and thousands of court staff who may want assistance, so we stay busy.  In order to most effectively provide assistance I liaise with my counterparts at the Marshals Service, and the Federal Protective Service to seek both short and long-term solutions to issues that affect federal court security.

Q: How would you describe a ‘typical’ workday for yourself?

Chief Templeman:

            I have an administrative job.  Typically my days are filled with routine “office work” - but are generally quite interesting and demanding.  We advocate for the security of judges, who by training and the nature of their work, are extremely precise. This means that my office makes certain that our communications are clear and accurate.

I provide (along with a Marshals Service representative) formal briefings on court security to all newly appointed “chief” judges, from the appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts.  There are often two or three such briefings per month.

             I help staff a national advisory council on court space and security issues, and prepare for meetings of the Committee on Judicial Security.  Both meet twice-a-year. 

 Otherwise, a normal day is spent at the computer, on the phone, and attending as few meetings as possible.                        

Having said that - I need to make this clear - the AOUSC is able to staff and operate its Court Security Office in this manner because the Marshals Service provides all the day-to-day operational and administrative heavy-lifting necessary to produce prisoners for proceedings and for providing both the contracted Court Security Officers and the security equipment which make courthouses safe.  The federal judiciary is protected by a truly remarkable cadre of deputy U.S. marshals and contracted Court Security Officers. (The Marshals Service, which is a Department of Justice entity, also has its own appropriation which funds its salaries and expenses related to judicial protection, fugitive apprehension, asset forfeiture, witness security, etc.)

Q: In terms of court security – what are some of the challenges you face?           

Chief Templeman:

One major challenge that my Office and the Marshals Service face is a debate about how many Court Security Officers are needed (and can be afforded) versus using more security technology to protect courthouses.  We know that providing Court Security Officers is more expensive than buying technology, but while technology can tell us that there is a security problem, Court Security Officers are required for response and resolution. 

A second related challenge is determining which, if any, of the ever-emerging security technologies are likely to be most effective and cost efficient in keeping courthouses safe.  Justifying and obtaining the funding for nationwide deployment of security technology depends on making a lot of sound choices, and the Marshals Service and my Office work hard to do just that.

Q: What do you think are the most critical issues facing the courts in terms of security?

Chief Templeman:

One of the most vexing issues is how to ensure the proper balance between security and openness, so that a courthouse is adequately protected without appearing to be a fortress.  Courthouses, both federal and state, have vulnerabilities and risk management issues, which are unique and much harder to deal with than the protection of other public buildings. This is primarily because the courts have proceedings, which must be open to the public. This means that alleged and convicted criminals, and participants in potentially life changing civil and bankruptcy cases, such as victims, witnesses, family members, and attorneys must all meet in a secure courtroom after having been screened when entering the facility - in a manner that keeps out dangerous weapons without creating an unwelcoming atmosphere.

The corollary to that issue is trying to determine what new threats will exploit courthouse vulnerabilities, and working to ensure that the desire for openness doesn’t tip the scale too far away from security.

Q: When you read or hear of acts of violence directed toward the courts what are your initial thoughts?

Chief Templeman:

My initial reaction is to try and remember that due to the perceived need for lightning speed in the reporting of breaking news, what is initially relayed may not be entirely accurate.  But, even with that in mind, particularly if the incident involves the federal courts, there are a series of steps and procedural protocols that we immediately initiate to notify other officials, and to see if the court itself needs any follow-on assistance. 

Q: How has the current challenged economy impacted your organizations operational missions? What are you doing differently than before the economic change?

Chief Templeman:

We’re now in the AOUSC’s fiscal year 2010, and are executing the budget that

was formulated in fiscal year 2008.  Right now the court security appropriation is adequate to fund the Marshals Service’s role in court security; the judiciary’s share of the Federal Protective Service’s role in providing courthouse perimeter security; and the salaries and expenses necessary to operate my Office.  The word from the AOUSC’s financial liaison with Congress is that our fiscal year 2011 funding will probably be constrained.  The Judicial Conference requires all programs, such as Court Security, to continually practice cost containment strategies, and has imposed spending caps to contain costs and limit growth.  Even so, within those necessary constraints I believe that the court security appropriation will continue to provide adequate protection for the federal courts.

Q: What do you hope to leave as a legacy for your Office?

Chief Templeman:

I’m planning to retire in four years. I’d like to have identified and solved all the recurring problems so that my successor’s time can be devoted solely to solving new ones.  But, realistically, that isn’t going to happen.  The difficulty is that many of the problems are not technical in nature, but rather deal with inherent differences in expectations between what the courts may want, what the judiciary’s court security appropriation can fund, and what the Executive Branch agencies which provide courthouse security can deliver.  I’ll probably have to settle for ensuring that we’ve done our best as an Office to make the courts as safe as possible.

In today’s austere fiscal climate it is important to realize that there are still tangible actions we can take that will significantly enhance the security of our courthouses, without a larger security budget.  However, it is necessary to invest time and forethought rather than dollars, as each building is a unique structure requiring customized planning.  However, some basic security principals are universal in their application to all courthouses.  Below are five real tangible, actionable items the court security practitioner can take immediately.

• Establish a Courthouse Security Committee: The committee’s composition should be composed of tenant representatives, such as the Chief Judge or designee, the courthouse security supervisor, prosecutor, public defender and department heads within the courthouse. This committee provides the founding platform upon which a continual dialogue can occur between the tenants in the courthouse on matters of security. The primary purpose of the committee is to illuminate security concerns and seek solutions that will improve the safety of all courthouse participants. The committee chair should be either the Chief Judge or courthouse security supervisor. The idea behind either being the chair is as follows:

The Chief Judge is usually very cognitive of the judicial process and how the courts balance security and individual liberties. The courthouse security supervisor should be intimately aware of the latest in security practices/protocols and aware of the due process that must be balanced within the courthouse framework.

As I define it:

“A courthouse security committee is a group of individuals who evaluate the security protocols of their courthouse and recommend/implement enhancements both physical and or procedural that may be needed to ensure the safety of all” – Barrett, Protecting Court - page 44.                                                           

• Conduct a Court Security Survey: this helps identify strengths and vulnerabilities of the courthouse and what issues need to be addressed in developing your emergency protocols. A checklist method is preferred as it ensures that procedures and physical/structural dynamics are not overlooked. Once completed, have another neighboring jurisdiction conduct a survey of your courthouse with the same checklist.(you can get such a checklist directly off my website and modify it for your own use - http://www.protectingcourt.com/court-security/security-checklist/ ) This provides a ‘fresh’ perspective that may identify new opportunities. We can become too familiar with our own surroundings and not always see the ‘obvious’ when assessing our own courthouse. Finally, reach out to the USMS, as they will usually provide a free assessment. This helps engage our federal brothers and provide an opportunity to initiate, re-new, or maintain good professional relationships.

• Identify REAL potential threats to your courthouse within the community dynamic both man made and natural: It is to be expected that an emergency event will occur at your courthouse. It is not a question of if – but WHEN! As such, it is critical that we identify at least those events we can expect such as: natural disasters – hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, flooding, etc… Man made – biological, fire, active shooter, bomb threats, escapes, etc…

• Establish/create/review emergency protocols for your buildings based upon real potential threats: The identification of potential threats provides the basis upon which emergency protocols can be developed. Emergency plans provide guidance to the court security staff and tenants on what they need to do when the event occurs. Tenants and other usually do not like to feel helpless in an emergency event (and can hamper emergency response if they don’t know what to do) and by engaging them it provides a force multiplier in your plans. This does require proactive engagement and training.

• Train & Practice the emergency plans with the tenants and emergency personnel: evacuations, medical emergencies, shelter in place, active shooter, etc…Training should be as real as possible to simulate the stress in an actual emergency. Practice, Practice, Practice. This needs to occur not just with court security staff, but the tenants as well.

There are many other ‘free’ things we can do, such as searching our courtrooms before and after court, practice weapon retention/defensive tactics, and conduct courthouse entry-screening audits. We are only limited by our imagination. While it is true that we must have the proper funding for adequate tools – x-ray machines, magnetometers, duress alarms, etc, a professional, trained staff and engaged tenants is critical. Emergency events have a tendency to occur at the least opportune time. As such, it is critical that we develop and have real security practices in place that provide guidance to tenants and our communities. Our court security staff, judiciary, tenants, and citizens deserve nothing less!

Earlier this month three judges were shot and killed in one courtroom in China and the assailant then committed suicide. A few days later in Brussels, a respected judge and her clerk were killed in a court of law. It was Belgium’s first judicial killing in an active court and it shocked the country’s populace and legal community.

Actual acts of violence directed towards the judiciary are relatively few, in relation to how many judges sit in a court of law everyday around the world. Because there are so few of these types of judicial assassinations – thankfully - it is important for the practitioner to examine them as much as possible to discover indicators that might help reduce the chances of an event from occurring in their community.  As such when these awful and tragic events occur – regardless of location – I look to see beyond the sensationalism of the media and seek those nuggets of facts that may help illuminate the event in the first place. By examining an event and deconstructing it, I hope to learn what – if anything – can I use to possibly mitigate the likelihood of an event from occurring in my community. I intentionally interject the word mitigate, because no one can eliminate all the risks involved in the courthouse security dynamic.

China prohibits the possession of firearms by its citizens. So the media report that three judges were shot in their court was quite surprising. Upon reading about this incident, I wanted to know more about the subject and how he specifically had access to guns. The media reports indicated that the 46-year old male, Zhu Jun, was in charge of security at a district post office. He checked out an automatic weapon and two pistols on a pretext of having them inspected at another governmental office. Question disturbingly answered! Head of security for another governmental agency equals legitimate access to weapons in China. The next question then – what triggered this individual into committing such an act?

According to news reports, Zhu Jun, left behind a note stating that he was upset with the court in regards to a property civil case he had before it - four years prior! He technically won the case but felt that his compensation ordered by the court took too long. That same year he went through a divorce and was diagnosed with terminal cancer. It was at this point in his life; he stated in his letter, that the idea of revenge and suicide germinated. The previous two months before his attack upon the court, he was at home on sick leave. Three days after returning to work he attacked.

The above factorial elements offer a possible explanation for his attack. A perception that the court was not just to him, a divorce and terminal illness are all events that can remove significant inhibitions of violence. The perception of injustice alone can push some people to commit acts of violence toward the court – but coupled with a divorce and terminal illness, it can then exacerbate a subject’s mental condition. It is important to note that Zhu Jun was ill, at home, for two months and returned to work for only three days prior to the attack. Knowing what occurred during those three critical days might illuminate more on the mindset of Mr. Jun. One can only speculate that his illness might have become more final and he knew he did not have much time if he wanted to take action on his perceived injustice. As such, he sought his revenge on the court – even though the sitting judges in that court were not the same ones in his case. It was an attack on the court and not an attack on the individual judges per se.

In Brussels the subject stated that he was upset at a particular judge because she had him evicted from his residence three years prior! The assailant, on the day of attack, sat patiently in the judge’s courtroom and waited. Once a majority of the cases were called, he stood up and shot her and the clerk, killing them both and ran out of the courthouse. The police captured him on the following day in a park. The subject was known to the police for committing various acts of violence in the 1990s, according to local media reports. Question, how did the assailant get a gun into a civil court? He simply brought it with him into the courthouse, as the civil courts in Brussels have no magnetometers. However, more probing questions, such as what inhibitors were being removed during the intervening three years that increased this individual’s capacity to be violent need to be asked. As a direct result of this tragedy, Belgium is now deliberating the best way to improve their court security.

Two culturally different countries, two attacks upon their judicial system separated by a few days earlier this month. Two broad common themes – both assailants appeared to nurture a grudge over a lengthy period of time and both had access to weapons. What are the implications for the practitioner? There is no quick fix. Vigilance, seeking best practices in court security, protective investigations and judicial threat management are the tools of our trade that must be constantly tuned and readied each day. – Be Safe

Jimmie

“Those who are able to adapt and change in accord with the enemy and achieve victory

are called divine…”

-Sun Tzu

In June of 2006 Judge Chuck Weller in Reno, Nevada was shot in the safety of his judicial chambers. An angry litigant of Judge Weller, fired a single rifle bullet from over 170 yards away in a nearby parking garage that quickly shattered not only glass but quickly pierced the façade of security on local judges. While Judge Weller was being taken to the hospital in an ambulance, he informed law enforcement that he believed he had been attacked by the same man that had began an internet attack campaign against him – Darren Mack.

Before Darren Mack had fired his single bullet, a small dark space on the Internet was raging about how unfair and unjust Judge Weller conducted himself in court. Judge Weller was being referenced on the Internet as Hitler, Monster, and Tyrant, not exactly pleasant compliments, but also not illegal. Whether Darren Mack initiated or participated in attacking Judge Weller in the sphere of the Internet is irrelevant, what is relevant were that these comments and demonization of Judge Weller were out there for all to see.

The Internet postings on Judge Weller had the potential to reinforce online individuals with the same perceptions of Judge Weller and even fan their own individual flames of grievances against him. To others in the online world it could have been viewed as just one more place on the web where a bunch of unjustified bitter crackpots pontificated. However, those Internet postings can be much more sinister as Michael Prout, Assistant Director of Judicial Security for the USMS, recently stated in the National Law Journal.

  “Unlike a letter or an e-mail, comments posted on an Internet Web site have the potential to be viewed by a countless number of persons. Internet postings that are hyper-critical and contain restricted personal information of the protectee, such as a home address or Social Security number, can create a large number of potential threateners virtually unknown to the USMS.”[i]

In the ‘old’ Internet days, court security threat assessment professionals focused primarily on websites and blogs for potential threats to their judiciary but now websites are becoming passé. Social networks, such as Myspace, Facebook and Twitter are the now  ‘new’ hot things. These rapidly expanding social networks are not just for kids. According to a recent study by iStrategylLabs, Facebook users aged 35 to 54 are among the fastest growing demographic on the web. These social networks allow for like-minded individuals spread out geographically to come together in cyperspace to further their thoughts, ideas, opinions, and actions in a free flow of information sharing – which may not always be for the betterment of society! 

It is hard not to notice the potential impact this new Internet dynamic of social networks coupled with the power of ‘Internet Information’ has upon court security judicial threat assessment practitioners. The fluidity in sharing of information by individuals and groups that are not friendly to the judiciary are a concern, especially if that information is personal, such as a home address. The Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 has added some new tools for our federal counterparts in addressing the concern of posting personal judicial information on the Internet. However, those tools are only applicable to the federal judiciary. Most states, as many Sheriffs’ are aware, having nothing to its equivalent. Furthermore, unlike the federal judiciary, most judges at the state and local level campaign for their office. This directly translates to judicial campaign websites.

Campaign websites have many purposes one of which is to personalize the individual running for office. The politician humanizes him/herself by showing pictures of their family, where they practice their faith, how strong his/her ties are to the community and even what neighborhood they live in. Without stating the obvious issues, this is problematic for an elected judiciary and those of us charged with their protection.

A colleague of mine relayed an incident to me of a politician that had come to him concerning threatening letters he had received. The politician was extremely concerned about how the subject, who had been sending him threatening letters, knew all this personal information about him and his family. He demanded from my colleague to immediately get to the bottom of how his family’s personal information had been disclosed to this threatener! My colleague, being the professional he is, politely pulled up the politicians’ election website and gently showed him all the information the subject referenced. To say the least, the politician immediately modified his campaign website.

To help combat these evolving Internet social networks, the court security threat assessment professional must engage with their counterparts in the field. We must share (what is legally permissible) with one another and ensure that we have a free flow of information to counter the threats that are being posed/posted out in cyber space and our local community. We must create our own ‘social networks’. Further we need to take advantage of the Internet and harness its information for our primary purpose, protecting the judiciary. Individual acts of subscribing to Internet news alerts, such as www.google.com/alerts helps us at a minimum to be aware of what is occurring currently out in cyberspace.

The idea that court security starts and ends in the courtroom is starting to fade. There are still pockets in our profession that maintain this perspective, but they are rapidly receding. The Internet communities are knocking loudly on our doors and forcing us to take notice.

The age of the Internet and its unabridged torrent of information has forced individuals, professionals, businesses and governments to seek new methodologies and paradigms to stay relevant in an era of constant change. In addition, the evolution of the Internet is becoming so rapid that it is difficult for Information Technology personnel to stay current yet alone those of us in the field of judicial threat assessments. Regardless we must. The Internet Genie is out of the bottle and our judiciary and communities need us to maintain our vigilance and intercept the next Darren Mack – whoever that may be….

[i] Marcia Coyle, The National Law Journal, March 19, 2009

Welcome to the first blog dedicated exclusively to court security. This will be THE PLACE on all matters on court security. It is my intention to create a quality venue for those responsible for the protection of our courts.  As such a post will be shared at least once a month or sooner – depending upon current events. 

If you have a question or wish for me to discuss a matter (in a public format) on a particular court security topic contact me via the Protecting Court website – I would truly like to hear from you about what is important to you.  For my inaugural post, I have submitted an article that I wrote for the first publication of Deputy & Court Officer Magazine, a new NSA publication. Let me know what you think!